This article examines the historical roots, constitutional legitimacy and contemporary relevance of independent Muslim politics in India. Tracing the debate from Gandhi's engagement with the Khilafat movement to Dr B. R. Ambedkar's interventions on minority rights, this article explores the diverse strands of Muslim political thought and representation. It also examines the record of Muslim representation in Parliament, state legislatures and governments since Independence. At its heart is a crucial question: does a political party led by Muslims necessarily become communal, or should its character be judged by its political programme and constitutional commitments? The article argues that independent political identity and participation in broader democratic coalitions need not be mutually exclusive.
The question of independent Muslim politics in India is often framed in a way that leaves little room for democratic debate. If Muslims organise politically under their own leadership, their politics is frequently described as communal. If they align with parties led by the Hindu majority, they are expected to do so in the name of secularism and national unity. This framing creates a false choice: Muslims can either have an independent political identity or be part of a broader democratic coalition, but apparently not both.
The history of Indian politics tells a more complicated story. Muslim political thought and mobilisation have never followed a single trajectory. They have included modernist social reform, constitutional negotiation, secular nationalism, demands for separate electorates, support for joint political platforms, advocacy of independent representation and, at times, communal politics. These tendencies have coexisted, competed and changed over time. To treat them as one political category is to overlook the diversity of Muslim society and the history of its engagement with Indian democracy.
The issue, therefore, is not whether Muslims should have a separate political identity. It is whether a democratic system can accommodate independent political voices while ensuring that they remain committed to constitutional equality, pluralism and the rights of others. The distinction between independent representation and communal politics is central to this debate.
When Mahatma Gandhi began playing a decisive role in Indian national politics, the fate of the Ottoman Caliphate had become a major religious concern for a substantial section of Indian Muslims. After the First World War, the future of the Caliphate was uncertain. The Ali brothers, Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, emerged as leading figures of the Khilafat movement in India.
Gandhi attended the Khilafat Conference in Delhi in November 1919. At the Calcutta session of the Indian National Congress in September 1920, he proposed linking support for the Khilafat cause with the Non-Cooperation Movement. The proposal was not universally accepted within the Congress. Prominent leaders such as Chittaranjan Das, Bipin Chandra Pal, Annie Besant and Muhammad Ali Jinnah opposed it. The resolution was eventually adopted, receiving 1,886 votes in favour and 884 against.
In Thoughts on Pakistan, B. R. Ambedkar recorded that large numbers of delegates, including taxi drivers from Calcutta, were allegedly mobilised to secure support for the resolution. The episode is significant not merely as an account of a Congress vote, but as an illustration of the political methods through which a national party sought to build support among a religious community.
Jinnah's opposition deserves particular attention. At the time, he was a prominent Congress leader associated with constitutional politics and Hindu-Muslim cooperation. He did not believe that the fate of a religious institution in Turkey should become a mass political issue in India. His position also needs to be understood in the context of developments within Turkey itself. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later known as Atatürk, was leading a movement towards a secular and modern political order and was opposed to the institution of the Caliphate. On 3 March 1924, the Turkish National Assembly abolished the Caliphate.
The Khilafat episode exposed an important tension in Indian nationalism. Gandhi believed that support for the Khilafat cause could bring a large section of Muslims into a common anti-colonial movement and strengthen Hindu-Muslim unity. Jinnah, by contrast, questioned the wisdom of making a religious issue from another country a central instrument of Indian political mobilisation. Their disagreement was not simply a difference over one movement. It reflected competing ideas about the relationship between religion, political identity and nationalism.
There were other contradictions within the politics of the period. In 1923, Maulana Muhammad Ali, while presiding over the Congress session at Kakinada, compared Gandhi to Jesus Christ and described him as the most Christ-like person of his time. Yet, in 1924, Muhammad Ali also stated that, however morally pure Gandhi might be, he would remain inferior to even a morally questionable Muslim in religious terms. Ambedkar recorded these episodes in Thoughts on Pakistan, published in 1940.
These statements illustrate the difference between political admiration and religious belonging. They also show that the relationship between Gandhi and Muslim leaders could not be reduced to a simple story of communal harmony or political disagreement.
The Khilafat movement can be seen as a major attempt by Gandhi and the Congress to address a large section of Muslims as a political constituency and bring it into the national movement. But this mobilisation was rooted, at least in part, in religious sentiment. The effort also contributed to Jinnah's temporary distance from the Congress mainstream, despite his earlier role as a prominent advocate of constitutional cooperation between Hindus and Muslims.
Over time, the Congress developed a political claim to represent all communities, groups and interests. Its claim to be the universal representative of the nation became a defining feature of its political identity. But the claim of universal representation raises a question: does a party represent a community merely because it receives votes from its members, or does it also have to provide them with an independent voice in its organisation, leadership and decision-making?
A political culture can acknowledge a community electorally while retaining a sense of distance from it. In such a relationship, the community is approached as a distinct social group whose votes are sought, but whose independent political agency is viewed with suspicion. This is one of the contradictions that has shaped the relationship between the Congress and Muslim politics.
The Lucknow Pact of 1916, reached between the Congress and the Muslim League, was an important moment in the development of political arrangements based on separate identity and coexistence. The agreement accepted separate electorates and laid down arrangements concerning Muslim representation in legislative bodies. The pact happened a few years before Gandhi's entry into national politics.
The formation of the Muslim League in 1906 had already marked an important stage in the organisation of Muslim political interests. Before the League emerged as a major political platform, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had advocated modern education among Muslims, greater participation in government employment and political caution towards the Congress. His concern was that a political system based on numerical majority could leave Muslims vulnerable to the dominance of a larger community.
The Muslim political position was not, however, uniform. In 1921, at the Ahmedabad session of the Congress, Maulana Hasrat Mohani moved a resolution demanding complete independence. By then, Gandhi had established decisive influence within the Congress. He opposed the proposal, arguing that the Congress should not move beyond its declared programme of Swaraj and the immediate objectives of the Non-Cooperation Movement without clarity about the consequences. Gandhi's priorities at that moment included the Khilafat question, the injustice in Punjab, Hindu-Muslim unity and the movement for Swaraj.
The political positions taken by the Congress, the All-India Khilafat Conference and the Muslim League at Ahmedabad in 1921 were not identical. Ambedkar, in Pakistan or the Partition of India, compared the proceedings of the three organisations. Hasrat Mohani's proposal was rejected in the Congress. The Khilafat Conference did not admit it for consideration, invoking the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority. The Muslim League discussed the proposal, but no vote was taken; the decision of its subject committee to reject it was treated as final.
This episode is revealing because it complicates the assumption that Muslim politics was necessarily more conservative than Congress politics. A Muslim leader was demanding complete independence at a time when Gandhi opposed the proposal within the Congress. The political positions of the organisations were shaped by their respective strategies and internal debates, not simply by the religious identities of their constituencies.
The Congress's position on independence continued to evolve. In 1927, the Madras session adopted a resolution making complete independence its goal. But at the 1928 Calcutta session, the issue again became contentious. Jawaharlal Nehru moved an amendment in favour of retaining complete independence as the objective. Gandhi proposed giving the British government one year to accept the recommendations of the Nehru Report, after which the Congress could move towards complete independence. In 1929, at the Lahore session under Jawaharlal Nehru's presidency, Purna Swaraj became the declared goal of the Congress.
Even in subsequent years, Gandhi's statements on Dominion Status retained a degree of flexibility. He did not rule out a constitutional arrangement under British rule if it could deliver what he considered genuine self-government. Meanwhile, Jinnah was arguing for Muslim political rights and representation within the constitutional framework of India. At that stage, Pakistan was not yet his declared political objective.
On 8 August 1931, Jinnah challenged Gandhi's claim that he was prepared to accept every Muslim demand. Jinnah argued that Muslim demands were not a blank cheque; they were specific political claims set out in his Fourteen Points, which had been formulated in 1929. His position at the time was not a demand for Pakistan but for political safeguards and independent representation within India.
This history demonstrates that independent Muslim politics was not necessarily a separatist project. It could be a demand for constitutional rights, political safeguards and a meaningful role in governance within a common political system.
The question of independent representation became more contentious as the prospect of independence and Partition drew closer. The Round Table Conferences brought representatives of Dalits, women, Muslims and other groups into a common constitutional discussion. These forums provided an opportunity for different communities to articulate their political claims and negotiate their place in a future constitutional order.
The Communal Award of 1932 continued separate electorates for Muslims and introduced or retained various arrangements for the representation of different communities. The Congress did not agree with the demand for separate electorates for Muslims. However, when the British government accepted the arrangement, the Congress neither openly supported nor opposed it. Separate electorates for Muslims had already been recognised in the constitutional reforms of 1909 and 1919.
The political conflict over representation became particularly visible after the provincial elections of 1937. Ambedkar's analysis of the Congress's conduct in these elections is important because it concerns the relationship between electoral majorities and political power-sharing.
In provinces where the Congress secured a majority, it was reluctant to share power with other political parties, particularly the Muslim League. In the United Provinces, the Muslim League wanted its representatives to be included in the Congress ministry. The Congress, however, required League members seeking ministerial positions to dissolve their separate parliamentary organisation, join the Congress and accept its discipline and programme.
Ambedkar interpreted this as a refusal to recognise Muslim representatives in their independent political capacity. The issue was not simply whether Muslim individuals could become ministers. It was whether they could participate in government while retaining the political identity and mandate of the party through which they had been elected.
Ambedkar contrasted this approach with the Congress's conduct in provinces where it did not have a majority. There, it was willing to form coalition governments with other parties without imposing the same condition that their members should join the Congress. He questioned the inconsistency: if coalition arrangements were unacceptable in principle, how could they be accepted when the Congress itself needed support?
Behind this dispute lay a larger constitutional question. Would independent India have a Hindu ruling community and subordinate minorities? Would minorities receive only administrative safeguards and protective measures, or would they have the right to participate in government through their own political representatives?
The same issue emerged during the formation of the Interim Government in 1946. The Congress was unwilling to give up its right to nominate Muslim ministers from its own quota. Jinnah, on the other hand, wanted the Muslim League to have the authority to select Muslim representatives. The Congress argued that, as a national party, it had the right to include members of any community among its representatives.
The disagreement was therefore not merely about the names of ministers. It concerned the authority to define political representation: should the Congress decide who represented Indian Muslims, or should Muslims have the right to select representatives through their own political organisation?
The question remains relevant. A party may include individuals from different communities and still refuse to recognise the independent political agency of those communities. Representation cannot be measured only by the presence of a few individuals. It also concerns the power to articulate demands, negotiate policy and participate in decisions.
Ambedkar's contribution to this debate was particularly significant because he did not treat the problem of minority representation as a narrow communal question. He approached it as a fundamental issue of democracy.
For Ambedkar, a democratic majority had the right to govern, but that did not mean it had the right to monopolise power or deny minorities an independent political identity. Self-government could not be understood merely as the replacement of colonial rule by the rule of a numerical majority. A democratic state had to create conditions in which all communities could participate meaningfully in political institutions.
Ambedkar's position was also notable for its independence from the political loyalties of the time. Although he had entered the Constituent Assembly with the support of the Muslim League, he could criticise Jinnah's movement from constitutional and secular politics towards communal politics. At the same time, he was equally willing to criticise the Congress and warn the majority against discrimination towards minorities.
On 17 December 1946, while the Muslim League was absent from the Constituent Assembly, Ambedkar supported the argument that consideration of the Objectives Resolution should be postponed to allow the League to participate. He urged the majority to abandon slogans and intimidating language and to make an effort to bring those who were unwilling to join the constitutional process into the discussion.
His argument was based on the belief that unity could not be imposed through legal authority alone. The majority had to recognise the concerns and apprehensions of its opponents and persuade them to participate voluntarily. A constitution prepared without the consent of a significant section of the population could not, merely by being adopted, resolve the political conflict.
On 1 May 1947, during the debate on the rights of minorities concerning language, script and culture, Ambedkar opposed amendments seeking to send the relevant provisions back to the committee. Mahavir Tyagi and K. M. Munshi had argued, in effect, that India should wait to see how minorities were treated in Pakistan before finalising the rights of minorities in India.
Ambedkar rejected this approach. Minority rights, he argued, had to be absolute. They could not depend on what another country chose to do within its own jurisdiction. If minorities were denied rights in another country, the Indian government could raise the matter through diplomatic channels. But that could not become a justification for limiting the rights of minorities in India.
He also referred to the rights to preserve language, script and culture, establish educational institutions and receive government assistance without discrimination. His position established a clear principle: the rights of Indian citizens could not be made conditional on the behaviour of another state or the religious identity of its population.
His speech on 4 November 1948 offered an equally forceful warning. Addressing those who opposed safeguards for minorities, Ambedkar said that minorities were an explosive force and that if this force was allowed to erupt, it could destroy the entire structure of the state. He referred to European history as a warning. He also argued that minorities in India had agreed to place their future in the hands of the majority. Unlike the Protestant minority in Ireland, which had rejected the prospect of living under a united Ireland without adequate safeguards, minorities in India had accepted majority rule.
But that acceptance, he insisted, created an obligation for the majority. It was the duty of the majority not to discriminate against minorities. He described the Indian majority as fundamentally a communal majority rather than merely a political majority. The distinction is crucial. A political majority can change through elections and shifting alliances. A communal majority, if treated as a permanent political identity, can turn democratic institutions into instruments of lasting domination.
Ambedkar's criticism was not confined to Muslim politics. In Pakistan or the Partition of India, he argued that Hindu Raj must be prevented at any cost because it would be a danger to liberty, equality, fraternity and democracy. He also criticised the idea of an Islamic state. His position was not that one form of religious nationalism could be accepted while another was rejected. He was concerned with the democratic consequences of any political arrangement that subordinated citizenship to religious identity.
This distinction is essential to the present debate. Ambedkar's defence of minority representation should not be misrepresented as an endorsement of communal parties. He recognised the need for independent political voices while warning against communal political systems. His concern was that no community should be permanently placed in a subordinate position.
The record of independent India must be examined in the light of these constitutional principles. The numbers of Muslim representatives in legislatures, governments and public employment raise questions about the extent to which the promises of equality and political participation have been realised.
Since the first general election in 1952, seven Muslim leaders have served as Chief Ministers, excluding Jammu and Kashmir: Barkatullah Khan in Rajasthan, Abdul Ghafoor in Bihar, C. H. Mohammed Koya in Kerala, Syeda Anwara Taimur in Assam, A. R. Antulay in Maharashtra, Mohammed Alimuddin in Manipur and M. O. H. Farook in Puducherry. Six served as Chief Ministers of states and one led the Union Territory of Puducherry. None completed a continuous five-year term, although Farook served as Chief Minister of Puducherry on three separate occasions.
Muslim representation in the Union Cabinet also presents a historical contrast. The first elected Cabinet formed after the 1952 general election included prominent Muslim leaders such as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai. By 1964, six Muslim leaders had held different positions in the Union Cabinet. In the current Union Cabinet led by Narendra Modi, there is no Muslim minister. Between 2014 and 2019, the government included three Muslim faces: Najma Heptulla, who served as a Cabinet minister; Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, who served first as a Minister of State and later as a Cabinet minister; and M. J. Akbar, who served as Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs.
The pattern of representation in the Lok Sabha is similarly revealing. Since 1952, Muslims have accounted for an average of around six per cent of elected members. The highest number was recorded in 1980, when 49 Muslim MPs entered the Lok Sabha, representing around nine per cent of its elected membership. At that time, Muslims constituted approximately 11 per cent of India's population. According to the 2011 Census, Muslims account for 14.2 per cent of the population. Yet, in the 18th Lok Sabha elected in 2024, their representation was approximately 4.4 per cent.
The picture in the Rajya Sabha has been relatively different. Since 1952, Muslim members have accounted for an average of around 11 to 12 per cent of the House. Their share among members nominated by the President has been approximately 13 per cent. Nomination and indirect election have therefore provided a relatively stronger avenue for Muslim representation than direct election to the Lok Sabha.
The distribution of the Muslim population across states also raises questions about political representation. According to the 2011 Census, Muslims constituted 34.2 per cent of Assam's population, 27 per cent of West Bengal's, 26.6 per cent of Kerala's and 19.3 per cent of Uttar Pradesh's. Assam and Kerala have each had a Muslim Chief Minister, though neither completed a five-year term. West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh have never had a Muslim Chief Minister.
Uttar Pradesh offers an instructive example of legislative representation. In 2012, 69 Muslim MLAs were elected, accounting for around 17 per cent of the Assembly's total strength. This was close to the Muslim share of the state's population and represented the strongest Muslim presence in the Assembly since 1952. Earlier, in 2007, 56 Muslim MLAs had been elected, accounting for approximately 14 per cent of the House. But in the 2014 Lok Sabha election, not a single Muslim candidate was elected from Uttar Pradesh.
These figures are not merely a record of electoral outcomes. They raise questions about the institutional position of Muslims in a political system based on majority rule. How secure are their political interests if their representation depends almost entirely on the decisions of parties whose leadership and core political constituencies lie elsewhere? Can a community's interests be adequately represented when it has little influence over the selection of candidates, the framing of political programmes or the formation of governments?
The issue is not that every community must be represented in exact proportion to its population in every elected body. The issue is the persistent gap between population share and political presence, and the limited opportunities for a community to exercise independent political agency.
The question of independent Muslim politics has become more prominent in recent years. Asaduddin Owaisi has emerged as one of its most visible advocates. Sharjeel Imam's writings and political arguments have also brought the question back into public discussion. The author's encounter with Imam during the Shaheen Bagh movement had already suggested that the demand for independent Muslim political initiative was part of a wider debate about representation and political agency. Imam subsequently faced serious criminal allegations in connection with speeches during the anti-CAA protests, the road blockade strategy and the wider conspiracy case relating to the Delhi riots. The judicial process concerning these allegations has continued.
Two prominent Muslim-led parties with a presence in Parliament and significant representation in state legislatures are the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) and the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM). The IUML has 22 MLAs in the Kerala Assembly, two members in the Lok Sabha and two in the Rajya Sabha. AIMIM has one Lok Sabha MP, Asaduddin Owaisi, from Hyderabad. It has seven MLAs in Telangana, five in Bihar and one in Maharashtra.
The two parties illustrate different forms of political influence. Owaisi represents a visible claim for independent Muslim political leadership at the national level. The IUML demonstrates how a Muslim-led party can influence the political agenda of a state and negotiate alliances from a position of electoral strength. Its relationship with the Congress in Kerala shows that independent political identity does not prevent participation in a wider coalition.
At the same time, Muslim voters continue to make choices within a complex electoral environment. They are courted by regional parties and by the Congress, which carries a historical claim to universal representation dating back to Gandhi's political leadership. The question is whether these parties regard Muslims as equal political participants or primarily as a constituency whose votes they seek during elections.
The 2024 Lok Sabha election provides one indication of this dilemma. The election, fought in the name of protecting the Constitution, helped the Congress increase its parliamentary strength after ten years. According to the CSDS-Lokniti post-poll survey, Muslim support for the Congress rose from 33 per cent in 2019 to 38 per cent in 2024. Support for Congress allies also increased from around 12 per cent to approximately 26 per cent. These estimates need to be read in the context of the survey's classification of allies; the Trinamool Congress in West Bengal and the Left parties in Kerala were not included among the Congress's pre-poll allies. The increase in support should not necessarily be interpreted as growing support for the Congress, since many of its alliance partners have built their own support base among Muslim voters at the Congress's expense.
Yet the rise in support for the Congress and its allies did not translate into an increase in Muslim representation in Parliament. The number of Muslim MPs fell from 26 in 2019 to 24 in 2024. In 2019, five of the Congress's 52 MPs were Muslim. In 2024, nine of its 99 MPs were Muslim. The share of Muslim MPs within the Congress therefore remained around nine per cent. Not a single Muslim candidate was elected to the Lok Sabha from the BJP or its allies.
AIMIM contested 15 Lok Sabha seats in 2024 and received approximately 1.4 million votes across the country. A substantial share of these votes came from Hyderabad, where Owaisi was elected. In Maharashtra's Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, formerly Aurangabad, AIMIM candidate Imtiaz Jaleel finished third.
The 2025 Delhi Assembly election offers another example. Of the seven constituencies considered Muslim-majority or electorally significant for Muslim voters, the Aam Aadmi Party won six. In Mustafabad, BJP candidate Mohan Singh Bisht received 85,215 votes, AAP's Adeel Ahmad Khan received 67,637, and AIMIM candidate Tahir Hussain received 33,474. The BJP won by 17,578 votes. AIMIM's vote total was higher than the victory margin, while Congress candidate Ali Mehdi received 11,763 votes and finished fourth.
The 2025 Bihar Assembly election provides a third example. The number of Muslim MLAs fell from 19 in 2020 to 11 in 2025. Muslims constitute around 17.7 per cent of the state's population, but their share in the Assembly was approximately 4.5 per cent. AIMIM emerged as the largest party in terms of Muslim MLAs, winning five seats, all in the Seemanchal region.
Taken together, the 2024 Lok Sabha and 2025 Delhi and Bihar Assembly results reveal a dilemma. Muslim voters often support parties they believe have the best chance of defeating the BJP. But where an independent Muslim-led party offers a recognisable political alternative, it also attracts support. These two impulses need not be contradictory. They may reflect the desire for both protection from majoritarian politics and independent representation within the democratic system.
The difficulty is that Muslims recognise the decisive role of the Union government and the Congress's position as the largest national opposition party. But the Congress has not recovered its earlier political strength in the Hindi-speaking states, which remain central to the formation of a government at the Centre. It must therefore rely on regional parties that have stronger electoral bases in their respective states. Muslim voters are compelled to negotiate between national political calculations, regional electoral realities and their own demand for representation.
The historical record makes it difficult to sustain the claim that Muslim politics has always been communal, or that a political party led by Muslims must necessarily be communal. Before Independence and in independent India, Muslim politics has never been monolithic. As the facts discussed earlier in this article—particularly those analysed by Dr B.R. Ambedkar—show, it has contained several ideological and political strands: social reform, secular nationalism, advocacy of independent political organisation, the desire to participate in joint political arrangements, and the demand for complete freedom from British rule. The political line pursued by Mahatma Gandhi in the Congress, meanwhile, was to accept constitutional reforms within the framework of Dominion Status.
There were differences among Muslims over the question of political safeguards. One section supported separate electorates and reserved political representation, while another believed in joint electorates and opposed reserved seats in legislatures. Begum Aizaz Rasul was a prominent advocate of the latter position in the Constituent Assembly. Communal politics also had its supporters among Muslims, just as Hindu communalism had its advocates in the Hindu Mahasabha. Ambedkar recognised these distinctions. He criticised the idea of an Islamic state, but did not regard an independent Muslim political identity or the demand for representation within the community as inherently communal. He considered the idea of a Hindu state equally, if not more, problematic. He had clearly stated that a Hindu Raj would be a great calamity for liberty, equality, fraternity and democracy.
The political participation of Muslim women was another important feature of that period. They were active both within and outside the Congress, engaged with committees and constitutional forums established under British rule, advocated social reform within their own society and articulated independent views on political representation. Muslim society was not a single political actor speaking through a single leadership.
The Congress's claim to represent all communities also produced a particular political relationship with Muslim voters. Its universalist claims and attempts at representation gradually encouraged a tendency to approach Muslims as a vote bank. Several political decisions marked Muslims out as a distinct community, while their personal and community-related concerns were kept at a distance from the politics of the majority leadership. The Hindu Code Bill and the question of a Uniform Civil Code are important in this context.
In the years after Partition, a language of sympathy and gratitude also developed around the fact that Muslims had chosen to remain in India rather than move to Pakistan. But this sentiment coexisted with another political tendency. Hindu nationalist politics increasingly marked Muslims out as a separate community, to be viewed either as unexpected guests in India or as citizens expected to accept the dominance of the majority and exercise their rights without asserting independent political claims. The language of gratitude, too, could carry an implication that Muslims owed something to the majority for having stayed in the country.
This second tendency is visible today as a reality of the ruling political order. If the more sympathetic side is judged by its outcomes, it appears to have remained largely a matter of verbal assurances, carrying forward the tradition of the blank cheque associated with Gandhi.
The assurances given to minorities in the Constituent Assembly need to be examined against the actual record of political representation. On 8 November 1948, Begum Aizaz Rasul said in the Constituent Assembly:
"I agree with Dr Ambedkar that it is the responsibility of the majority not to discriminate against any minority. If this principle is accepted, I can assure you that, so far as Muslims are concerned, we shall not ask for reservation of seats. We believe our interests are the same as those of the majority and hope the majority will treat all minorities justly and fairly."
Her position was that if the principle of non-discrimination by the majority was accepted, Muslims would not seek reserved seats in the legislatures under a system of joint electorates. This, however, did not mean that she opposed reservation in every sphere. Begum Aizaz Rasul supported reservation for minorities in government services. She made a clear distinction between reserved legislative seats, which she considered of little value, and representation in public services, where she regarded safeguards as necessary.
On 25 November 1949, Pattabhi Sitaramayya made an important observation about the assurance given to minorities. He described it as an implied Gentlemen's Agreement and said:
"The majority community has to see to it that this implied gentlemen's agreement is honoured in letter and in spirit, and that we give our friends more seats than their population entitles them to receive. If we fail to do so, we shall not be able to justify the great concessions that they have made."
The question is whether we, as a nation, honoured this understanding. The figures discussed at the beginning of this article suggest otherwise. They pose an uncomfortable question to the politics of majority leadership. What does the low number of Muslim representatives in some Lok Sabhas, or the absence of Muslim representation in the Union Cabinet, tell us about the state of political representation?
In 2006, the Sachar Committee found that Muslims accounted for approximately 4.9 per cent of government employment. In 2015, the government informed Parliament that while consolidated figures for the recruitment of minorities in government services were collected, separate figures based on religion were not maintained. The absence of religion-wise recruitment data makes it difficult to assess the subsequent position of Muslim representation in public employment.
The ideology of those in power today reinforces the otherness of Muslims. It places their food habits, ways of life, everyday practices and religious culture within a negative narrative of identity, seeking to restrict their citizenship rights in keeping with Savarkar's political conception of Hindutva. One foundation of this politics is the polarisation of Hindus against Muslims. At the same time, the fear of Muslims is used to push the social and economic needs and concerns of Hindu society itself into the background. Issues such as triple talaq, the Uniform Civil Code and population growth are also frequently presented through narratives that construct Muslims as a negative or threatening presence.
Dr Ambedkar had warned that such prejudices would harm the Indian nation. On 17 December 1946, in the Constituent Assembly, he cautioned against any attempt to resolve the Hindu-Muslim question through force, by bringing Muslims into subjection and compelling them to accept a Constitution framed without their consent. He warned:
"If anyone thinks that the Hindu-Muslim problem can be solved by force, that is, by war, in order to bring Muslims into subjection and compel them to accept a Constitution framed without their consent, this country will remain trapped in a cycle of repeated conquest."
The Opposition, on the other hand, often appears even more apprehensive. Today, it does not have the courage even to offer or hold out a blank cheque. Even mentioning Muslims seems politically disadvantageous to it. This distance reinforces a particular form of otherness. The attempts made by governments after Independence to honour the spirit of the Gentlemen's Agreement, and the hesitation born of a sense of gratitude after Partition, have now assumed a different form. The Congress, which claims to represent all communities, wants to win Muslim votes once again, but appears reluctant to make the concerns of Muslim society part of its political discourse. Its hesitation to speak openly about the problems of Muslims only provides sustenance to communal politics.
The question must also be asked in the other direction. Are parties led by Muslims necessarily communal? Is Muslim society inherently communal? Is Hindu society inherently communal? If parties led by members of the Hindu majority can be secular, why should Muslim-led parties be presumed communal?
In India, political parties are registered under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Their constitutions are required to affirm allegiance to the Constitution, socialism, secularism and democracy, and to uphold India's sovereignty, unity and integrity. A party being led by Muslims and a party being communal are therefore not one and the same thing. The religious identity of a party's leadership, by itself, does not establish the political character of that party.
In Kerala, the Congress has an alliance with the Indian Union Muslim League. On what grounds, then, do the Congress and other parties describe a party led by Asaduddin Owaisi, or another Muslim-led party, as communal? Is this question also connected to political competition and the traditional claim of established parties over Muslim votes? The label of communalism, in such cases, needs to be examined in relation to a party's actual politics, rather than inferred simply from the identity of its leadership.
The same distinction is necessary when examining Muslim society and its parliamentary politics. Muslim society is not a homogeneous formation. The question of caste, the activities of Pasmanda politics and internal social inequalities are real features of its social and political life. Muslim women's activism and debates around issues such as triple talaq have also been part of this political landscape. Nor does the Muslim community hold a single, uniform position on the Uniform Civil Code.
The Shaheen Bagh movement, led by women, was among the country's largest citizenship movements. It was not an expression of a single, uniform political outlook. The women who participated in it brought different experiences, ideological positions and political perspectives to the movement. Their presence itself reflected the plurality of voices within Muslim society and the wider democratic movement.
There have also been electoral alliances between the AIMIM and parties led by Hindus and Buddhists. Such alliances have taken place in different elections, with varying outcomes in terms of electoral success and failure. They are another indication that Muslim-led political organisations are not necessarily confined to a single religious or political constituency.
The point is not that these different voices and positions constitute one common programme. It is that they exist, sometimes in disagreement with one another, within Muslim society and its politics. Pasmanda politics, debates over caste and social inequalities, Muslim women's activism, differing positions on the Uniform Civil Code and the political diversity visible at Shaheen Bagh cannot be subsumed under a single communal identity or represented as the view of one leadership. Muslim politics, like the politics of any other social group, contains competing interests, arguments and political choices.
The existence of parties led by Muslims and the pursuit of an Islamic state or religious nationalism are two different matters. The distinction is no different from that between having a party led by Hindus and pursuing the politics of Hindutva. The politics of Hindutva and the idea of a Hindu Rashtra can be as hostile to democracy as the idea of an Islamic state. A party's leadership may emerge from a particular community without seeking to organise the state around that community's religion. The democratic character of a political organisation cannot be determined by the religious identity of its leaders alone.
An independent Muslim-led party cannot attain national power solely on the strength of a Muslim support base, which constitutes around 14 per cent of India's population. Its electoral reach at the national level is necessarily connected to the possibility of alliances with sections of the majority community. This is a political reality, just as the need for wider political support is a reality for parties led by the majority community. The question of alliances, therefore, does not by itself negate the case for independent political identity.
The same issue arises in relation to the internal social composition of political constituencies. Caste, Pasmanda politics, gender and social inequalities are already part of the debates and political activity within Muslim society. Their presence is evidence of the different interests and voices that exist within the community. Similarly, the question of whether parties led by Hindus can claim to represent a secular democracy cannot be separated from their relationship with Muslim society and the question of its actual political representation.
This is not a choice between independent political identity and participation in wider coalitions. The two can coexist. The possibility of alliances between Akhilesh Yadav and Owaisi, or Rahul Gandhi and Owaisi, needs to be understood in terms of the interests of their respective support bases and their political programmes. Such arrangements would be comparable to the alliance between the Indian Union Muslim League and the Congress in Kerala, or to the alliances that the BJP and the Congress have entered into with different parties in Jammu and Kashmir under different political circumstances.
The central issue, therefore, is not whether Muslim political organisations should remain separate from other parties or merge their identities into a larger formation. It is whether independent political identities can participate in shared political programmes and negotiate alliances without being treated as illegitimate. The relationship between the Congress and the Indian Union Muslim League in Kerala demonstrates that an independent political identity and a wider coalition are not mutually exclusive.
Independent political identity and a shared political programme are not opposed to each other.
About the Author
Sanjeev Chandan is the editor of StreeKaal, a feminist platform with both print and digital editions. He has contributed to several leading publications, including The Times of India, National Herald, BBC Hindi, The Wire Hindi, The Mook Nayak, Jansatta, Dainik Bhaskar and Lokmat Samachar. His writings engage with feminism, caste, social justice, democracy and Indian politics.
He is currently working on a novel set between 1947 and 1956, tracing the constitutional and political developments of that transformative decade through the lives of Dr B. R. Ambedkar and Dr Savita Ambedkar. The two are the protagonists of the novel, which also explores the story of their love and companionship against the backdrop of the making of the Indian Constitution and the struggle for social equality.
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