— ✍️Dr. Pankaj Tambe
Uttar Pradesh’s 2027 Assembly election will not be decided simply by adding the previous vote shares of the Samajwadi Party and Congress. It will be determined by whether these parties can construct a new social coalition while convincing voters that the coalition can provide representation, protection and competent government.
This distinction between electoral arithmetic and political sociology is fundamental. Castes do not vote as permanently transferable blocs. Their political preferences are mediated by leadership, candidate selection, local power relations, memories of previous governments and perceptions of which party can win. An alliance succeeds when it changes these perceptions. It fails when it remains an agreement between leaders without becoming an accepted arrangement among workers and voters.
The Congress–SP experience itself illustrates this contrast.
The SP and Congress formally allied for the 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly election. The announced agreement gave 298 seats to the SP and 105 to Congress. The campaign presented Akhilesh Yadav and Rahul Gandhi as “UP ke do ladke.” But the alliance won only 54 seats—47 for the SP and seven for Congress—while the BJP secured 312 of the 403 constituencies.
The failure was not simply a rejection of the two leaders. The alliance was concluded late, its local machinery remained divided, and more than 20 constituencies witnessed “friendly fights.” The parties nominally shared seats but did not create a unified system for candidate selection, worker coordination and vote transfer. The 2017 experience showed that a last-minute alliance cannot compensate for organisational weakness.
The 2024 Lok Sabha election produced a different result. Congress contested 17 seats, the SP 62 and the Trinamool Congress one. The SP won 37 and Congress six, giving the INDIA bloc 43 of Uttar Pradesh’s 80 Lok Sabha seats. The NDA won 36, including 33 for the BJP.
More importantly, the two alliances were almost equal in votes. INDIA received approximately 43.52 per cent, while the NDA secured around 43.69 per cent. Yet INDIA won more seats because its votes were distributed more efficiently. This is a classic demonstration of how first-past-the-post elections convert geographically concentrated coalitions into seats. The detailed 2024 figures show that Congress won 6 of its 17 constituencies while the SP converted 37 of 62 contests into victories.
The SP’s candidate strategy was equally important. It gave a large majority of its OBC tickets to non-Yadav communities and fielded Dalits, including on constituencies that were not constitutionally reserved. According to a post-election analysis drawing on CSDS-Lokniti data, 82 per cent of Yadavs, 92 per cent of Muslims, 56 per cent of non-Jatav Dalits and 25 per cent of Jatavs supported the INDIA bloc. The same study found that the BJP retained substantial advantages among upper castes and non-Yadav OBCs.
The 2024 result therefore represented a partial social realignment, not merely a successful seat-sharing formula. The SP moved beyond its image as principally a Yadav-Muslim party, while Congress supplied a national narrative centred on constitutional protection, reservation, economic inequality and institutional accountability.
But an Assembly election is more demanding. Uttar Pradesh will hold 403 local contests, each influenced by candidate reputation, sub-caste relations, district organisation and memories of state governments. The alliance cannot simply reproduce the 2024 parliamentary result by dividing each Lok Sabha constituency into five Assembly seats.
Any serious assessment must begin by recognising that the BSP remains an autonomous political formation.
The party won only one Assembly seat in 2022 and no Lok Sabha seat in Uttar Pradesh in 2024. Nevertheless, it received 9.39 per cent of the state’s Lok Sabha vote—almost equal to Congress’s 9.46 per cent. A party capable of attracting more than eight million votes cannot be declared socially irrelevant merely because first-past-the-post denied it parliamentary representation.
The BSP’s strength historically rested on three connected foundations: the creation of an independent Dalit political identity, a disciplined organisational structure, and the conviction among many Dalits that the party represented their dignity in the institutions of the state.
As Christophe Jaffrelot observed in his analysis of caste-based mobilisation, Dalit identification with the BSP did not depend only on the caste of its candidates. It also reflected the perception that the BSP’s leadership and programme acted in the interests of Dalits. The relationship was therefore ideological and representational, rather than merely numerical.
This history explains why many Jatav voters continue to support Mayawati even when the party appears electorally weak. It also explains why attempts by other parties to appropriate Kanshi Ram or Ambedkar without offering Dalits organisational authority are often treated with suspicion.
Mayawati has repeatedly stated that the BSP will contest the 2027 election independently. She has argued that previous alliances failed because the votes of partner communities did not transfer adequately to BSP candidates. She has left little present possibility of a formal BSP–SP–Congress arrangement. As of 2026, her declared position remains that the BSP will fight all Assembly constituencies on its own.
For the SP–Congress alliance, the BSP creates two challenges.
The first is electoral. Even a BSP vote share of 8–10 per cent can decide dozens of closely contested constituencies. However, these votes should not automatically be classified as “anti-BJP votes.” Some BSP supporters may choose the BJP over the SP because of local social conflicts, memories of the 2012–2017 SP government or perceptions of administrative protection. Others may move toward Congress, the ASP or abstention.
The second challenge is political legitimacy. If SP and Congress describe the BSP merely as a spoiler, they risk insulting voters who regard it as the principal institutional achievement of the Ambedkarite movement in North India. Such attacks could consolidate the very BSP vote they seek to attract.
The alliance would be better served by acknowledging Mayawati and Kanshi Ram’s contribution, avoiding humiliating language and demonstrating through candidates and policies that Dalits would exercise authority within an SP–Congress government. The objective should not be to erase the BSP but to become a credible second preference for BSP voters in constituencies where their own candidate is not perceived as viable.
The Aazad Samaj Party presents a separate challenge. The BSP is an institutionalised party with a historical governing record; the ASP represents younger, movement-oriented and confrontational Dalit assertion centred on Chandrashekhar Azad.
Its statewide electoral strength should not be exaggerated. In the 2022 Assembly election, the ASP contested 110 seats, received only 0.13 per cent of the statewide vote, and all its candidates lost their deposits. But the Nagina Lok Sabha result in 2024 demonstrated what it can achieve where leadership, local organisation and social concentration converge. Chandrashekhar won more than 51 per cent of the vote and defeated the BJP candidate by approximately 1.51 lakh votes.
Nagina was not simply an individual victory. It established that a new Dalit-led party could defeat both the BJP and the official INDIA candidate when it was regarded as the most credible local challenger.
The ASP is now attempting to expand this concentrated success. In July 2026, it announced 45 constituency in-charges as potential candidates. Of these, 18 were Scheduled Castes, 16 OBCs, 10 Muslims and one a Sikh. It also selected SC leaders for five unreserved constituencies. This distribution indicates an attempt to construct a broader Dalit–OBC–Muslim coalition rather than remain exclusively a Dalit organisation.
The ASP’s impact will be geographically uneven. It may be important in western Uttar Pradesh, among younger Dalits and in constituencies where Bhim Army networks have provided legal, educational or protest-based mobilisation. In many other regions, it may lack the organisational depth needed to convert visibility into votes.
The SP–Congress alliance should therefore avoid two opposite errors. It should neither dismiss Chandrashekhar as a marginal “vote-cutter” nor assume that his Nagina victory gives him a statewide transferable vote.
A limited and transparent accommodation with the ASP in constituencies where it possesses demonstrable organisation could strengthen the anti-BJP coalition. Such an arrangement could involve a small number of genuinely winnable seats, joint support on issues of atrocities and reservation, and respect for the ASP’s autonomous identity. If a formal understanding proves impossible, a non-aggression arrangement in selected close constituencies would still be preferable to mutually destructive competition.
Congress’s appointment of Rajendra Pal Gautam as its Uttar Pradesh in-charge and chairman of its Scheduled Castes Department is important in this context. An Ambedkarite activist, lawyer, former Delhi minister and two-term MLA, Gautam can provide Congress with a recognisable social-justice voice.
But Gautam cannot simply be presented as Congress’s answer to both Mayawati and Chandrashekhar. Each represents a different political tradition: Mayawati embodies institutional Bahujan power; Chandrashekhar represents movement-based assertion; Gautam operates within a national party seeking to recover its former social coalition.
His most productive role would be to serve as a bridge between Congress’s constitutional narrative and concrete Dalit demands. He should promote locally rooted Dalit leaders, not monopolise representation himself. Congress must field SC candidates in suitable unreserved constituencies, give Dalit leaders authority within the organisation and convert social justice into measurable commitments.
These could include an SC Development Budget and Accountability Act, a public reservation-roster and backlog portal, stronger scholarship and fee-reimbursement guarantees, affordable access to private educational institutions, protection against atrocities, and time-bound grievance redress. Such a programme would enable Congress to compete on institutional performance rather than symbolic appropriation.
The SP–Congress alliance can win Uttar Pradesh, but only if five conditions are satisfied.
First, the alliance must be settled early. As of August 2026, final seat-sharing has not been concluded. Congress is seeking constituencies based on winnability rather than a purely numerical formula. Both parties are conducting assessments of previous results, caste combinations, organisational strength, candidates and vote transfer. This process must finish early enough to establish joint constituency committees and resolve rebellions.
Second, Congress should seek quality rather than artificial parity. A 50:50 division would ignore the SP’s much larger Assembly presence. Congress should contest a smaller number of constituencies where it has credible candidates, historical support or the capacity to unite SP and Congress voters. At the same time, it must contest enough seats to preserve an independent organisational future.
Third, the PDA formula must become institutional rather than rhetorical. Dalits and non-Yadav OBCs must receive winnable tickets, including in general constituencies, as well as visible roles in the alliance’s decision-making bodies. Representation should not be confined to reserved constituencies.
Fourth, the alliance must address Dalit anxieties about an SP-led government. Memories of local domination, unequal policing and insufficient respect for Ambedkarite institutions cannot be dismissed as BJP propaganda. The coalition needs a public commitment to administrative neutrality, atrocity prevention, fair police procedures and protection of welfare entitlements. Social justice without state capacity will not persuade risk-conscious voters.
Fifth, the alliance must combine constitutional politics with material concerns. Protection of reservation and the Constitution was powerful in 2024, but it must now be connected to government recruitment, examination paper leaks, unemployment, inflation, education costs, agricultural insecurity and the declining income of small traders. The BJP’s welfare beneficiaries cannot be won by threatening existing benefits; the opposition must guarantee continuity while adding pathways for employment and mobility.
- Dr. Pankaj Tambe is an Ambedkarite thinker, writer, and researcher based in Nagpur, Maharashtra. His work focuses on the thought of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, social justice, equality, democracy, constitutional values, and the struggle against caste discrimination. Through his writings, he promotes Ambedkarite philosophy and encourages critical thinking, education, and social transformation.
You can also join our WhatsApp group to get premium and selected news of The Mooknayak on WhatsApp. Click here to join the WhatsApp group.
'The Mooknayak' practices democratic journalism. It is a media platform committed to the Constitution, democracy, and social justice. If you also want 'The Mooknayak' to always raise the voices of the marginalized and show the pain of the voiceless, please subscribe.
PLEASE SUBSCRIBE US