Supreme Court Stresses 'Intent to Humiliate' as Core for SC/ST Act: Quashes Charges Against Accused with No Direct Role

New Delhi – In a significant ruling on caste-based atrocity laws, the Supreme Court of India on January 12, allowed the appeal of a Bihar resident Keshav Mahto and quashed criminal proceedings against him under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and relevant Indian Penal Code (IPC) sections. The bench, comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Alok Aradhe, set aside the Patna High Court's February 15, 2025, order that had upheld a trial court's cognizance and summoning notice dated October 9, 2020.

The case originated from an incident at a Santhali Tola Aanganwadi Center in Kahalgaon, Bhagalpur district, Bihar, where the complainant, a member of a Scheduled Caste, alleged that Mahto and other co-accused arrived and hurled caste-related abuses while he sat with a friend. This led to FIR No. 451/2019 under Sections 341 (wrongful restraint), 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 504 (intentional insult), 506 (criminal intimidation), and 34 (common intention) of the IPC, alongside Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act for intentional insult and caste-based abuse in public view.

A chargesheet was filed, and the III Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (SC/ST), Bhagalpur, took cognizance against all accused, prompting Mahto's appeal under Section 14A of the SC/ST Act, which the High Court dismissed.

During the Supreme Court hearing, counsel for the State candidly admitted a lack of evidence against Mahto, stating that "except the fact that the appellant was also present at the relevant point of time with the co-accused, there is no specific overt act attributed to him." The bench, after examining the FIR and chargesheet, found no material indicating Mahto's direct involvement. "We have looked into the allegations levelled in the FIR. We tried to understand the nature of the allegations, more particularly, so far as the present appellant is concerned. It does not seem to be the case of the prosecution that the appellant herein uttered any word from his own mouth," the court observed, emphasizing that mere presence does not imply participation.

Delving into the legal framework, the judges meticulously analyzed the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act.

Drawing from the recent precedent in Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249), they reiterated the essentials for Section 3(1)(r):

"(a) Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;

(b) Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;

(c) Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and

(d) Accused must do so at any place within public view."

The court clarified that "the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community." Mere knowledge of the victim's caste status, they added, is insufficient without proof of caste-motivated humiliation.

On Section 3(1)(s), which penalizes abusing a SC/ST member "by caste name" in public, the bench stressed that "merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence." It must be shown that "the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse," with an underlying intent to denigrate the caste and cause humiliation.

In Mahto's case, "there is nothing on record to indicate that the alleged acts of the appellant were motivated for the reason that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. Neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contains any whisper of an allegation of insult or intimidation by the appellant herein, let alone one made with the intention to humiliate the complainant."

The court also dismissed the IPC charges, noting that "the allegations levelled against the appellant in the FIR do not meet the essential ingredients of any of the offences and are rather general in nature. Mere presence of the appellant does not establish his participation in the alleged offence." Deeming a trial against Mahto a "travesty of justice," the bench allowed the special leave petition, quashed the prosecution solely against him, and disposed of pending interlocutory applications. The original complainant, served notice, did not appear to contest the appeal.