Amravati- In a landmark judgment that reinforces transgender rights while cautioning against misuse of legal provisions, the Andhra Pradesh High Court ruled that a transgender woman in a heterosexual marriage has the right to file a dowry harassment complaint under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The court, presided over by Justice Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa, however, quashed the criminal proceedings against her husband and his family, citing a lack of substantive evidence and "bald allegations."

The court’s decision, delivered on June 16, in Criminal Petitions 6783, 7064, and 6830 of 2022, not only addressed the specific allegations but also reaffirmed the legal protections available to transgender women in heterosexual marriages, marking a significant step toward gender inclusivity in Indian jurisprudence.

Background of the case

The case originated from a complaint by Pokala Sabhana, a transgender woman, against her husband, Viswanathan Krishna Murthy, his parents, Krishna Murthy Viswanatham and Viswanadan Vidya and a relative, Kesavaraj Parthibhan. The complaint, registered in 2019 at the Women Police Station, Ongole, alleged that the accused subjected Sabhana to cruelty and demanded dowry after their marriage. The marriage took place on January 21, 2019, at Arya Samaj, Hyderabad, after a romantic relationship that began in Chennai, despite the accused’s awareness of Sabhana’s transgender identity.

According to the complaint, Sabhana’s parents gave Rs. 10 lakh as dowry, along with 25 sovereigns of gold, 500 grams of silver articles, and household items worth Rs. 2,00,000 at the time of the marriage. The couple lived together in Ongole until March 11, 2019, when Viswanathan left for his parents’ house in Chennai and ceased communication. Sabhana alleged receiving a threatening message from Viswanathan’s phone on April 27, 2019, warning her to leave or face death. She further claimed that the accused, under the direction of Kesavaraj Parthibhan, attempted to send Viswanathan abroad to evade her.

The police investigation culminated in a charge sheet, leading to the registration of C.C. No. 585 of 2022 at the Court of II Additional Munsif Magistrate, Ongole. The accused filed petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) to quash these proceedings, arguing that a transgender woman cannot be considered a “woman” under Section 498-A IPC and that the allegations were vague and baseless.

The court framed two primary points for determination:

1. Whether a complaint filed by a transgender woman under Section 498-A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is maintainable.

2. Whether there were justifiable grounds to quash the criminal proceedings against the accused.

Maintainability of the Complaint by a Transgender Woman

The petitioners’ counsel, Thandava Yogesh, argued that a transgender woman cannot be considered a “woman” under family law, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India (2023 INSC 920). He contended that, as Sabhana could not bear children, she did not fully qualify as a woman for the purposes of Section 498-A IPC. The counsel further argued that the Supreme Court’s observations in Supriyo limited the recognition of transgender individuals under family law.

The court, however, rejected this argument, emphasizing the evolving legal framework protecting transgender rights in India. It relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438, which recognized transgender persons’ right to self-identify their gender and affirmed their protections under Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The court noted, “The argument of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the Respondent No.2, being a trans woman, cannot be regarded as a ‘woman’ merely because she is incapable of biological reproduction, is deeply flawed and legally impermissible.”

The court also referenced the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, which defines a transgender person as “a person whose gender does not match with the gender assigned to that person at birth” and does not require medical or surgical procedures for legal recognition. The court highlighted Section 2(k) of the Act, which includes trans women, and affirmed that Sabhana’s gender identity as a woman was legally valid, supported by a certificate from Dr. V. Jayaraman of Kilpauk Medical Hospital, Chennai.

Drawing on the Madras High Court’s ruling in Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration (AIR 2019 Mad 265), the court noted that a marriage between a male and a transgender woman is valid under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The court also cited the Bombay High Court’s decision in Vithal Manik Khatri v. Sagar Sanjay Kamble (MANU/MH/1221/2023), which recognized transgender women as “aggrieved persons” under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

In a pivotal observation, the court addressed the Supriyo decision, clarifying that both the majority and minority opinions supported the right of transgender persons in heterosexual relationships to marry under existing laws. The court quoted the minority opinion of Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud: “Transgender persons in heterosexual relationships have the right to marry under existing law including personal laws which regulate marriage.” The majority opinion by Justice S. Ravindra Bhat concurred, stating, “We agree with the conclusion that transgender persons in heterosexual relations have the right to marry under existing laws, including in personal laws regulating marriage.”

The court concluded, “Respondent No.2, being a transwoman in a heterosexual relationship, cannot be deprived of her right to lodge a complaint against her husband or the relatives of her husband for the alleged offences.” Thus, Sabhana’s complaint was deemed maintainable.

Why Criminal Proceedings were Quashed

On the second point, the court examined the allegations to determine whether they constituted offenses under Section 498-A IPC (cruelty by husband or his relatives) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (demand for dowry). The court found the allegations against all four accused to be “bald and omnibus,” lacking specificity and prima facie evidence.

The complaint alleged that Viswanathan married Sabhana despite knowing her transgender identity, lived with her briefly, and then abandoned her. It further claimed that her parents gave dowry, and she received a threatening message from Viswanathan’s phone. However, the court noted, “The entire complaint does not disclose even a single allegation to show that all the accused subjected her to cruelty or demanded dowry.” The court emphasized that Section 4 requires evidence of a dowry demand, which was absent, especially given the love marriage context.

Regarding the two accused i.e. Viswanathan’s parents, the court found no allegations of cruelty or dowry demands. Sabhana herself admitted to cordial relations with them, and their absence from the marriage ceremony further weakened the case. The court observed, “The entire complaint does not disclose the prima facie allegations against Accused Nos.2 and 3 to attract either the offence under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the D.P. Act.”

For Accused No. 4 (Kesavaraj Parthibhan), the court found the allegation that he directed the actions of the other accused to be baseless, stating, “Mere allegation that Accused Nos.1 to 3 are acting to the tunes of Accused No.4, is not a ground to connect him with the alleged offences.”

Citing Supreme Court precedents like Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana (2024) 12 SCR 559, Muppidi Lakshmi Narayana Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2025 INSC 562), and ABC v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025 INSC 671), the court underscored the need to prevent misuse of Section 498-A IPC in matrimonial disputes. It noted, “A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud.”

The court concluded that continuing the proceedings would constitute an “abuse of process” and exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash C.C. No. 585 of 2022 against all accused.